

DNS OUT THERE ...

Lars-Johan Liman, M.Sc.
Sr. Systems Specialist
Netnod Internet Exchange

BEAR IN MIND ...

One DB to Rule Them All ...


DNS is a database.

DNS is **one** database ...

- ... that is distributed over many servers,
- ... that can contain a variety of information,
- ... that is hierarchical, but

It is **ONE** database.

The full service resolver (local nameserver) hides the complexity of the server tree from the stub resolver (end client).



DNS – Fair and Equal

ALL domain names are treated equal!

- ▶ There is **NO** structural difference between
arpa.

lab.csc.kth.se.

www.volvo.se.

10.23.19.8.in-addr.arpa.


10.ugly.23.hack.55.to.33.confuse.12.students.se.

(or even)

.

Trick Questions

Can you have an A record for SE. ?



Trick Questions


Can you have an A record for SE. ?

- **YES!**

se. 3600 IN A 10.23.19.2

Trick Questions

Can you have a PTR record for kth.se. ?




Trick Questions

Can you have a PTR record for kth.se. ?

- **YES!**

kth.se. 600 IN PTR server14.kth.se.

(OK. Not very useful, but the DNS system doesn't mind!)



Trick Questions

Can you have an MX record for "." ?

Trick Questions

Can you have an MX record for "." ?

- **YES, of course you can!**

```
.                86400   IN      MX      10  smtp.cafax.se.
```

(And yes, the mail system will not cooperate, but the DNS system doesn't mind.)

Categories of Record Types

The DNS uses its own records to maintain the structure of the database itself.

Two categories of records:

- **Data carrying records: Used by applications to reach various resources.**
A, AAAA, MX, PTR, SRV, NAPTR, ...
- **Structure carrying records: Only used by the DNS system itself to locate the sought data records.**
SOA, NS, CNAME, DNAME, ...

(The meat and the bones of the “body”).

Cacheing is Vital

The cacheing mechanism in the full service resolver helps off-load traffic from the root name servers.

- **The higher up, the more traffic (almost ...).**
- **Without cacheing, every query would have to start at the root.**
- **Not A Good Idea™**
- **The root servers receive enough junk as it is ...**

SPEAKING OF ROOT NAME SERVERS

Root Name Servers

So what's the deal?

- **What, why, who, where, when?**

13 root name servers on the Internet:

- **X.root-servers.net. (where $X \in \{a, b, \dots, m\}$)**

Operated by 12 organisations.

- **i.root-servers.net is operated by Netnod.**
- **Verisign operates 2 letters: a and j.**

Overview:

- **<http://www.root-servers.ORG/>**

Root Server System Expansion

15 years ago it was 13 machines.

- **10 x USA + Sweden + UK + Japan.**

Big nations started to complain.

- **China, India, France, Germany, ...**


Technical limitation on the number of servers!


- **What to do?**



Ugly hack: **ANYCAST!**


- **Now 300+ sites in total!**


ANYCAST


































ROOT ZONE ADMINISTRATION


The Good Old Days™

Used to be Jon Postel (RIP), head of the IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority).

- ... and that was that.
- ... and then he died!

Jon initiated the creation of an organisation for the purpose.

- **This has developed into ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers).**
- **The IANA is now a subdivision of ICANN.**




ICANN

ICANN was designed as a multi-stakeholder, bottom-up organisation.

- **Tried to let everyone have a say – from single citizens to business, and governments.**
- **This works only so-so.**

ICANN is a policy organisation, and it sets policies for new TLDs, and decides which to establish.

New gTLD program established under which hundreds of new TLDs are established.



1974!

ARPANET DIRECTORY NIC 19275 Jan. 1974				HOST NAMES
HOST NAMES				
HOSTNAME	HOST ADDR (Dec)	LIAISON	STATUS	
AFWL-TIP	176	D Hyde (505)247-1711 x3803	TIP, Up 3-74	
ALOHA-TIP	164	R Binder (808)948-7066	TIP	
AMES-11	208	J Hart (415)965-5935	USER, up 12-73	
AMES-67	16	W Hathaway (415)965-6033	SERVER	
AMES-TIP	144	W Hathaway (415)965-6033	TIP	
ANL	2	L Amiot (312)739-7711 x1309	SERVER, up 2-74	
ARPA-DMS	28	S Crocker (202)694-5037	USER, Agency use only	
ARPA-TIP	156	S Crocker (202)694-5037	TIP	
BBN-11A	5	R Thomas (617)491-1850 x483	Peripheral processor for #69, up 12-73	
BBN-1D	232	A McKenzie (617)491-1850 x441	USER	
BBN-NCC	40	A McKenzie (617)491-1850 x441	USER	
BBN-TENEX	69	R Thomas (617)491-1850 x483	SERVER	
BBN-TENEXB	133	R Thomas (617)491-1850 x483	SERVER, Limited	
BBN-TESTIP	158	A McKenzie (617)491-1850 x441	TIP (magtape)	
BELVOIR	27	W Andrews (703)664-5511	USER, up 6-74	
BRL	29	M Romanelli (301)278-4574	USER	
CASE-10	13	J Calvin (216)368-2984	SERVER	
CCA-TENEX	31	R Winter (617)491-3670	SERVER	
CCA-TIP	159	R Winter (617)491-3670	TIP	
CMU-10A	78	H Van Zoeren (412)621-2600 x160	SERVER	
CMU-10B	14	H Van Zoeren (412)621-2600,x160	SERVER	
CMU-11	142	C Pierson (412)621-2600 x130	USER, up Spring 74	
CMU-CC	206	D King (412)621-2600 x2683	USER, up Spring 74	
DOCB-TIP	153	S Stevenson (303)499-1000 x3138	TIP	
EGLIN	?	E Blackwell (904)882-3734	Up 3/74	
ETAC	20	G Petregal (202)433-3911	USER, up Spring 74	
ETAC-TIP	148	G Petregal (202)433-3911	TIP (magtape)	
FNWC	33	M Reese (408)646-2817	USER, up 2-74	
FNWC-TIP	161	M Reese (408)646-2817	TIP	
GWC-TIP	152	A Wells (402)294-2968	TIP (magtape)	
HARV-1	73	B Reussow (617)495-4147	USER	
HARV-10	9	B Reussow (617)495-4147	SERVER	
HARV-11	137	S Bradner (617)495-3864	USER	
HASKINS	197	F Cooper (203)865-6163	USER (VDH), up Spring 74	
HAWAII-500	100	J Davidson (808)944-7455	SERVER, up 1-74	
HAWAII-ALOHA	36	R Binder (808)948-7066	USER, Up 12-73	
I4-TENEX	15	J McConnell (408)735-0635	SERVER	
I4-TENEXA	79	J McConnell (408)735-0635	Peripheral processor for #15	
ILL-CAC	12	T Milke (217)333-8469	USER	
ILL-NTS	76	T Milke (217)333-8469	USER	
ISI-DEVTENEX	150	R Hoffman (213)822-1511 x190	USER, up 1-74	
ISI-SPEECH11	22	R Hoffman (213)822-1511 x190	USER, up 1-74	

2015:
Current
Chairman of
ICANN

The IANA

The IANA is an administrative function that is regulated by a contract with the US Dept of Commerce*. (This may come to and end “soon”.)

The IANA manages (among other things) the contents of the TLD database, under policies set by ICANN.

The IANA sends requests for update of the root zone to ...

*) Specifically its National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)

The DoC (NTIA) and Verisign

NTIA must approve any changes

- **... before they can be implemented by ...**

Verisign, who

- **Generate DNSSEC signature, and**
- **Change the actual root zone file.**

The root server operators ...

- **... pick up the root zone file from Verisign.**
- **The root zone is publicly available at <ftp://ftp.internic.net/domain/root.zone>**

Root Server Operators

12 separate organisations

- **Great variety: from military, via universities, to commercial, to not-for-profits.**

No formal relationship with

- **DoC (except for Verisign)**
- **IANA (except for Verisign)**
- **ICANN**
- **each other**
- **any parent organisation (none exists!)**

Technically very well coordinated!

Root Server Operators

Go by old gentlemen's agreements


- ▶ ... with **Jon Postel (RIP)**, former head of IANA.
- ▶ **There is no process to change the set of root ops!**

Vast experience in DNS, routing and system administration.

100,00 % uptime* on the system as a whole for more than 15 years.

Meet 3 times/year for coordination.

*) Knock on wood ...



i.root-servers.net

Ordinary DNS servers.


- **Serves the "." zone.**
- **Stockholm: located in communications bunkers provided by PTS.**

Anycast

- **50+ places across the globe.**
- **From Stockholm to Johannesburg, from Wellington to San Francisco ...**
- **... including odd places like Colombo, Katmandu, Yerevan, Thimphu, Port Vila**

Serves ~4.5 billion queries/day ... to the root zone alone.

s1.sth



Which Node?

How do I know which node I'm using?

```
$ dig @i.root-servers.net. \  
  hostname.bind. TXT CHAOS \  
  +short
```

“s1.sth”

A Few Words About DNSSEC

Upside

- Crypto signatures – validation of data.
- Protects against cache pollutioning (“Kaminski attacks”).
- Can be used to **authenticate host keys** (i.e., no more web certificates!).

WAY COOL!!

Downside

- Complex administration (use tools!).
- Time sensitive.
- More effective reflection attacks (use rate limiting!).
- **SO: GOOD SH*T, BUT USE IT RIGHT!**

Contact Information

Lars-Johan Liman
Netnod Internet Exchange
Box 30194
104 25 Stockholm
Sweden

Tel: +46–8–562 860 12
E-mail: liman@netnod.se

Slides available at:
[http://www.netnod.se/liman/presentations/kth/
201510-ipop-DNS-liman.pdf](http://www.netnod.se/liman/presentations/kth/201510-ipop-DNS-liman.pdf)